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1. INTRODUCTION
CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY ADDING VOTES (CCAV) and CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY DELETING VOTES (CCDV)
are two of the election control problems studied in the pioneering paper by Bartholdi III, Tovey, and Trick [1992].
These two problems model the applications where an election controller aims to make a distinguished candidate a
winner by adding or deleting a limited number of voters. Since their seminal work, the complexity of these problems
under a lot of prestigious voting correspondences have been studied, and it turned out that many problems are NP-
hard [Bartholdi III et al. 1992; Faliszewski et al. 2011a; Faliszewski et al. 2009; Lin 2012]. However, when restricted to
single-peaked elections, many of them become polynomial-time solvable [Brandt et al. 2015; Faliszewski et al. 2011b].
Recall that an election is single-peaked if there is an order of the candidates, the so-called axis, such that each voter’s
preference purely increases, or decreases, or first increases and then decreases along this order. A natural question
is that, as preferences of voters are extended from the single-peaked domain to the general domain with respect to
a certain concept of nearly single-peakedness, where does the complexity of these problems change? A large body
of results have been reported with respect to some nearly single-peaked domains. This paper aims to extend these
study by investigating the complexity of the above two problems under several important voting correspondences
when restricted to the k-axes and k-candidates partition single-peaked elections (k-axes and k-CP elections for short
respectively). Generally speaking, an election is a k-axes election if there are k axes such that every vote is single-
peaked with respect to at least one of the axes. Equivalently, an election is a k-axes election if the votes can be
partitioned into k sets each of which induces a single-peaked election. An election is a k-CP election if there is a k-
partition (C1, . . . , Ck) of the candidates such that the subelection restricted to each Ci is single-peaked. Clearly, 1-axis
elections and 1-CP elections are exactly single-peaked elections. The voting correspondences studied in this paper
include r-approval, Condorcet, Maximin, and Copelandα, where α is a rational number such that 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Additionally, we also resolve an open question regarding the complexity of recognizing 2-axes elections by deriving
a polynomial-time algorithm.
1.1. Related Work
Our study is clearly related to [Brandt et al. 2015; Faliszewski et al. 2011b] where many voting problems including
particularly CCAV and CCDV for r-approval, Condorcet, Maximin, and Copeland1 were shown to be polynomial-time
solvable when restricted to single-peaked elections. Resolving an open question, Yang [2017b] recently proved that
CCAV and CCDV for Borda are NP-hard even when restricted to single-peaked elections.
Our study is also closely related to the work of Yang and Guo [2014a; 2017; 2018] where CCAV and CCDV for
numerous voting correspondences in elections of single-peaked width at most k and k-peaked elections were studied.
Generally, an election has single-peaked width k if the candidates can be divided into groups, each of size at most k,
such that every vote ranks all candidates in each group consecutively and, moreover, considering each group as a
single candidate results in a single-peaked election. An election is k-peaked if there is an axis  such that for every
vote pi there is a k-partition of  such that pi restricted to each component of the partition is single-peaked. Obviously,
k-CP elections are a subclass of k-peaked elections. In addition, it is known that any election of single-peaked width k
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2is a k′-CP election for some k′ ≤ k [Erde´lyi et al. 2017]. However, there are no general relation between k-axes elections
and k-CP elections, and between k-axes elections and elections with single-peaked width k [Erde´lyi et al. 2017].
In addition to CCAV and CCDV, many other problems restricted to single-peaked or nearly single-peaked domains
have been extensively and intensively studied in the literature in the last decade (see, e.g., [Betzler et al. 2013; Cornaz
et al. 2012; Cornaz et al. 2013; Yu et al. 2013] for WINNER DETERMINATION, [Walsh 2007] for POSSIBLE/NECESSARY
WINNER DETERMINATION, [Yang 2015b] for MANIPULATION, [Menon and Larson 2016] for BRIBERY, and [Fal-
iszewski et al. 2014; Yang 2017a] for some other important strategic voting problems). Approval-Based multiwin-
ner voting problems restricted to analogs of single-peaked domains have also been investigated from the complexity
perspective very recently [Elkind and Lackner 2015; Liu and Guo 2016; Peters 2018].
Finally, we point out that a parallel line of research on the complexity of single-crossing and nearly single-crossing
domains has advanced immensely too (see, e.g., [Magiera and Faliszewski 2017; Skowron et al. 2015]).
We also refer to the book chapters [Elkind et al. 2017; Hemaspaandra et al. 2016] and references therein for impor-
tant development on these studies.
1.2. Our Contributions
Our contributions are summarized as follows.r We study CCAV and CCDV in k-axes and k-CP elections under r-approval, Condorcet, Copelandα, and Maximin.r We show that many problems already become NP-hard even when k is a very small constant. However, there
are several exceptions. (See Table 1 below for the concrete results.) In addition, our results reveal that from the
parameterized complexity point of view, CCAV and CCDV for some voting correspondences behave completely
differently. For instance, for r-approval, CCAV in k-axes elections is fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) with respect
to k, but CCDV is already NP-hard even for k = 2, meaning that CCDV restricted to k-axes elections is even para-
NP-hard with respect to k. Our results also reveal that when restricted to different domains, the same problem
may behave differently. For instance, for Condorcet, we show that both CCAV and CCDV in k-axes elections are
FPT with respect to k, but they become para-NP-hard with respect to k when restricted to k-CP elections. Finally,
we would like to point out that our study also leads to numerous dichotomy results for CCAV and CCDV with
respect to the values of k.r We study the complexity of determining whether an election is a k-axes election. It is known that for k = 1, the
problem is polynomial-time solvable [Bartholdi III and Trick 1986; Doignon and Falmagne 1994; Escoffier et al.
2008]. Erde´lyi, Lackner, and Pfandler [2017] proved that the problem is NP-hard for every k ≥ 3. We complement
these results by showing that determining whether an election is a 2-axes election is polynomial-time solvable,
filling the last complexity gap of the problem with respect to k.
2. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we give the notions used in the paper. For a positive integer i, we use [i] = {j ∈ N : 0 < j ≤ i} to denote
the set of all positive integers no greater than i.
Election. An election is a tuple E = (C,ΠV), where C is a set of candidates and ΠV a multiset of votes, defined as
permutations (linear orders) over C. For two candidates c, c′ ∈ C and a vote pi ∈ ΠV , we say c is ranked above c′ or pi
prefers c to c′ if pi(c) < pi(c′). For two subsets X,Y ⊆ C of candidates, a vote with preference X  Y means that this
vote prefers every x ∈ X to every y ∈ Y . For brevity, we use x  y for {x}  {y}. Here, pi(c) is the position of c in pi, i.e.,
pi(c) = |{c′ ∈ C : pi(c′) < pi(c)}|+ 1. For C ⊆ C and a vote pi ∈ ΠV , let pi(C) = {pi(c) | c ∈ C}. In addition, let piC : C → [|C|]
be pi restricted to C so that for c, c′ ∈ C, pi(c) < pi(c′) implies piC(c) < piC(c′). Let ΠCV = {piC | pi ∈ ΠV}. Hence, (C,ΠCV )
is the election (C,ΠV) restricted to C. We use NE(c, c′) to denote the number of votes preferring c to c′ in E . We drop E
from the notation when it is clear from the context which election is considered. For two candidates c and c′ in C, we
say c beats c′ if N(c, c′) > N(c′, c), and c ties c′ if N(c, c′) = N(c′, c).
For a linear order  over a set A, we say that two elements in A are consecutive if there are no other elements
from A between them in the order.
Voting correspondence. A voting correspondence ϕ is a function that maps an election E = (C,ΠV) to a non-empty
subset ϕ(E) of C. We call the elements in ϕ(E) the winners of E with respect to ϕ. The following voting correspondences
are related to our study.
r-approval. Each vote approves exactly its top-r candidates. Winners are those with the most total approvals.
Throughout this paper, r is assumed to be a constant, unless stated otherwise.
Borda. Every vote pi gives m − pi(c) points to every candidate c and the winners are the ones with the highest total
score. Here, m is the number of candidates.
Only for personal use. Updated: January 2020.
3CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY ADDING VOTES (CCAV)
SP (k ≥ 2)-Axes 2-CP (k ≥ 3)-CP general
r-approval P ♣ FPT (Theorem 3.1) P ♦ r ≤ 3: P ♥ r ≤ 3: P ♥
r ≥ 4: NP-hard (Theorem 3.3) r ≥ 4: NP-hard ♥
Borda NP-hard ♠ NP-hard z
Condorcet P ] FPT (Theorem 4.2) open NP-hard (Theorem 4.3) NP-hard \
Copelandα∈[0,1) open NP-hard (Theorem 4.4) NP-hard U NP-hard ¶
Copeland1 P ] NP-hard (Theorem 4.4) NP-hard (Theorem 4.5) NP-hard ¶
Maximin P ] NP-hard (Theorem 4.4) NP-hard (Theorem 4.5) NP-hard §
CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY DELETING VOTES (CCDV)
SP (k ≥ 2)-Axes 2-CP (k ≥ 3)-CP general
r-approval P ♣ r ≤ 2: P ♥ r ≤ 2: P ♥
r ≥ 3: NP-hard (Theorem 3.5) r ≥ 3: NP-hard ♥
Borda NP-hard ♠ NP-hard £
Condorcet P ] FPT (Theorem 4.2) open NP-hard (Theorem 4.3) NP-hard \
Copelandα∈[0,1) open NP-hard (Theorem 4.4) NP-hard U NP-hard ¶
Copeland1 P ] NP-hard (Theorem 4.4) NP-hard (Theorem 4.5) NP-hard ¶
Maximin P ] NP-hard (Theorem 4.4) NP-hard (Theorem 4.5) NP-hard §
Table 1: A summary of the complexity of CCAV and CCDV in general and nearly single-peaked domains. Here,
“P” stands for “polynomial-time solvable”. Moreover, “SP” stands for “single-peaked”. Our results are in boldface.
All FPT results are with respect to k. Results marked by ♣ are from [Faliszewski et al. 2011b], by ♦ from [Yang
and Guo 2017], by ♥ from [Lin 2011], by ♠ from [Yang 2017b], by z from [Russell 2007], by ] from [Brandt
et al. 2015], by ¶ from [Faliszewski et al. 2009], by \ from [Bartholdi III et al. 1992], by § from [Faliszewski et al.
2011a], by £ from [Liu and Zhu 2013], and by U from [Yang and Guo 2014a].
Copelandα (0 ≤ α ≤ 1). For a candidate c, let B(c) (resp. T (c)) be the set of candidates beaten by c (resp. tie with c).
The Copelandα score of c is |B(c)|+ α · |T (c)|. A Copelandα winner is a candidate with the highest score.
Maximin. The Maximin score of a candidate c ∈ C is minc′∈C\{c}N(c, c′). Maximin winners are those with the highest
Maximin score.
Condorcet. The Condorcet winner of an election is the candidate that beats all other candidates. It is well-known that
each election has either zero or exactly one Condorcet winner. In addition, both Copelandα and Maximin select only
the Condorcet winner if it exists. In this paper, the Condorcet correspondence refers to as the following one: if the
Condorcet winner exists, it is the unique winner; otherwise, all candidates win.
Our discussion also needs the concept of weak Condorcet winner. Precisely, a candidate in an election is a weak
Condorcet winner if and only if it is not beaten by anyone else.
Nearly single-peaked elections. An election (C,ΠV) is single-peaked if there is a linear order  of C, called an
axis, such that for every vote pi ∈ ΠV and every three candidates a, b, c ∈ C with a  b  c or c  b  a, it holds
that pi(c) < pi(b) implies pi(b) < pi(a). An election (C,ΠV) is k-axes single-peaked if there are k axes 1, . . . ,k such that
every pi ∈ ΠV is single-peaked with respect to at least one of {1, . . . ,k}. In addition, (C,ΠV) is a k-CP election if
there is a k-partition (C1, . . . , Ck) of C such that for all i ∈ [k], (Ci,ΠCiV ) is single-peaked.
Problem formulation. For a voting correspondence ϕ, we study the following two problems.
CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY ADDING VOTES (CCAV)
Input: An election (C,ΠV), a distinguished candidate p ∈ C, a multiset ΠW of votes, and a positive integer `.
Question: Is there ΠW ⊆ ΠW such that |ΠW | ≤ ` and p uniquely wins (C,ΠV ∪ΠW ) with respect to ϕ?
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4In the above definition, votes in ΠV and ΠW are referred to as registered votes and unregistered votes, respectively.
For an instance ((C,ΠV), p ∈ C,ΠW , `) of CCAV, a subset ΠW ⊆ ΠW is called a feasible solution of the instance if p
uniquely wins (C,ΠV ∪ΠW ).
CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY DELETING VOTES (CCDV)
Input: An election (C,ΠV), a distinguished candidate p ∈ C, and a positive integer `.
Question: Is there ΠV ⊆ ΠV such that |ΠV | ≤ ` and p uniquely wins the election (C,ΠV \ΠV ) with respect to ϕ?
For an instance ((C,ΠV), p ∈ C, `) of CCAV, a subset ΠV ⊆ ΠV is called a feasible solution of the instance if p uniquely
wins (C,ΠV \ ΠV ). An optimal solution of a Yes-instance of CCAV/CCDV refers to as a feasible solution consisting of
the minimum votes.
In this paper, we study CCAV and CCDV in k-CP (k-axes) elections. For CCAV, we mean that (C,ΠV ∪ΠW) is a k-CP
(k-axes) election.
For NP-hardness results, we are only interested in the minimum values of k for which CCAV and CCDV in k-CP
(k-axes) elections are NP-hard. In fact, one can easily show that, for all voting correspondences considered in this
paper, if CCAV and CCDV in k-CP (resp. k-axes) elections are NP-hard, so are they in (k + 1)-CP (resp. (k + 1)-axes)
elections. Our NP-hardness results are based on reductions from the following problem.
RESTRICTED EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS (RX3C)
Input: A universe U = {c1, c2, . . . , c3κ} and a collection S = {s1, s2, . . . , s3κ} of 3-subsets of U such that each ci ∈ U
occurs in exactly three elements of S.
Question: Is there an S′ ⊆ S such that |S′| = κ and each ci ∈ U appears in exactly one element of S′?
The RX3C problem is NP-hard [Gonzalez 1985].
Parameterized complexity. A parameterized problem instance is a tuple (I, κ), where I denotes the main part
and κ is a parameter which is often an integer. A parameterized problem is FPT if any of its instance (I, κ) can
be determined in O∗(f(κ) · |I|O(1)) time, where f is a computable function and |I| is the size of the main part. A
parameterized problem is para-NP-hard if there is a constant c such that the problem is NP-hard for any parameter
greater than c. For more detailed introduction to parameterized complexity, we refer to [Downey and Fellows 1992a;
Downey and Fellows 1992b].
3. r-APPROVAL
In general elections, CCAV and CCDV for r-approval are NP-hard even when r is a constant (r ≥ 4 for CCAV and r ≥ 3
for CCDV) [Lin 2012]. However, when restricted to single-peaked elections, both problems become polynomial-time
solvable (even when r is not a constant) [Faliszewski et al. 2011b]. We complement these results by first showing that
CCAV for r-approval in k-axes elections is FPT with respect to k. Our FPT-algorithm is based on the following two
observations
OBSERVATION 1. If a vote is single-peaked with respect to an axis , then all approved candidates in the vote lie
consecutively in .
OBSERVATION 2. For every Yes-instance of the CCAV problem, any optimal solution consists of only unregistered
votes approving the distinguished candidate.
The above observations suggest that to solve an instance, we need only to focus on a limited number of candidates—
the candidates at most “r far away” from the distinguished candidate p in the k-axes of the given instance.
THEOREM 3.1. CCAV for r-approval in k-axes elections is FPT with respect to the combined parameter k + r.
PROOF. Let C, ΠV , ΠW , p ∈ C, ` be the components of the input of a CCAV instance as in the definition, where
(C,ΠV ∪ ΠW) is a k-axes election. For each c ∈ C, let sc(c) be the score of c with respect to ΠV , i.e., sc(c) is the
number of votes in ΠV approving c. Let Πp be the multiset of all votes pi ∈ ΠW such that pi(p) ≤ r. For each vote
pi ∈ Πp, let C(pi) be the set of candidates ranked in the top-r positions, i.e., C(pi) = {c ∈ C | pi(c) ≤ r}. Moreover, let
B =
⋃
pi∈Πp C(pi) \ {p}. Due to Observation 2, any optimal solution consists of only votes from Πp. Moreover, adding
a vote in Πp never prevents p from winning. Hence, if the given instance is a Yes-instance, there must be a feasible
solution consisting of exactly min{|Πp|, `} votes. We reset ` := min{|Πp|, `}, and seek a feasible solution with ` votes
in Πp. Obviously, the final score of p is sc(p)+`. If there is a candidate c ∈ C such that sc(c) ≥ sc(p)+`, the given instance
must be a NO-instance. Assume that this is not the case. The question is then whether there are ` votes in Πp such
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5that for every c ∈ B at most sc(p)+`−sc(c)−1 of the votes approve c. This can be solved in FPT time with respect to |B|.
To this end, we give an integer linear programming (ILP) formulation with the number of variables being bounded by
a function of |B|. We call a vote pi ∈ Πp a β-vote if β = C(pi) \ {p}. First, we create for each subset β ⊆ B an integer
variable xβ which indicates the number of β-votes that are included in the solution. The restrictions are as follows.
Let nβ be the number of β-votes in in Πp. First, for each variable xβ , we require that 0 ≤ xβ ≤ nβ . Second, the sum of
all variables should be `, i.e.,
∑
β⊆B xβ = `. Third, for each c ∈ B, it must be that sc(c) +
∑
c∈β xβ ≤ sc(p) + ` − 1. By
the result of Lenstra [1983], this ILP can be solved in FPT time with respect to |B|. Due to Observation 1, B contains
at most k · 2(r − 1) candidates. The theorem follows.
Note that the FPT-algorithm in the proof of Theorem 3.1 does not need any k-axes of the given election. What
important is that when the given election is a k-axes single-peaked, the cardinality of the set B is bounded from above
by k ·2(r−1). The framework in the proof does not apply to CCDV for r-approval in k-axes elections. The reason is that
any optimal solution of CCDV consists of only votes disapproving the distinguished candidate p. Hence, we cannot
only confine ourselves to a limited number of candidates.
Now we consider k-CP elections. Yang and Guo [2017] developed a polynomial-time algorithm for CCAV for r-
approval in 2-peaked elections. As 2-CP elections are a special case of 2-peaked elections, their polynomial-time al-
gorithm directly applies to CCAV for r-approval in 2-CP elections. However, if k increases just by one, we show that
the problem becomes NP-hard even for r = 4. Yang and Guo [2017] also proved that CCAV for r-approval in 3-peaked
elections is NP-hard for every r ≥ 4. Their proof is via a reduction from the INDEPENDENT SET ON GRAPHS OF MAXI-
MUM DEGREE 3 problem and, more importantly, the election constructed in their proof is not a 3-CP election. We use a
completely different reduction to show our result. Particularly, our reduction is from the RX3C problem. The following
lemma is easy to see.
LEMMA 3.2. Let  be a linear order over C and let C ⊆ C be a subset of candidates that are consecutive in . Then
we can construct a linear order pi over C such that all candidates in C are ranked above all candidates not in C, and pi
is single-peaked with respect to .
THEOREM 3.3. CCAV for r-approval in 3-CP elections is NP-hard for every r ≥ 4.
PROOF. Let (U = {c1, . . . , c3κ}, S = {s1, . . . , s3κ}) be an instance of RX3C. We create a CCAV instance with the
following components. Consider first r = 4.
Candidates C. We create in total 24κ + 5 candidates. In particular, for each cx ∈ U , we create a set C(cx) =
{c1x, c2x, c3x, c4x} of four candidates. Let
C1 =
⋃
cx∈U
C(cx)
be the set of all these candidates. Hence, |C1| = 4 · 3κ = 12κ. In addition, for each s = {cx, cy, cz} ∈ S, we first create
three candidates cx(s), cy(s), and cz(s) corresponding to cx, cy, and cz, respectively, then we create one candidate s′.
Let C2 be the set of all these candidates corresponding to all s ∈ S. Hence, |C2| = 4 · 3κ = 12κ. Finally, we create a
set C3 of five candidates denoted by p, q1, q2, q3, and q4, respectively. The distinguished candidate is p.
We now construct the registered and unregistered votes. For each vote to be created below, we only first specify the
approved candidates in the vote, and then we discuss the 2-axes and use Lemma 3.2 to specify the linear preference
of the vote.
Registered Votes ΠV . First, we create 5κ−1 votes approving q1, q2, q3, and q4. Then, for each s = {cx, cy, cz} ∈ S, we
create 5κ−2 votes approving cx(s), cy(s), cz(s), and s′. Finally, for each cx ∈ U , there are 5κ−2 votes approving c1x, c2x, c3x,
and c4x.
Unregistered Votes ΠW . For each s = {cx, cy, cz} ∈ S, we create four votes as follows:r pis approving cx(s), cy(s), cz(s), p;r pixs approving cx(s), c1x, c2x, p;r piys approving cy(s), c1y, c2y, p; andr pizs approving cz(s), c1z, c2z, p.
Finally, we set ` = 5κ, i.e., we add at most 5κ votes.
The above construction clearly takes polynomial time. Now we discuss the preferences of the above votes. Let
1 =
(
c11, c
2
1, c
3
1, c
4
1, . . . , c
1
3κ, c
2
3κ, c
3
3κ, c
4
3κ
)
.
Let2 be an order of C2 such that for every si, i ∈ [3κ−1], all candidates created for si are ordered before all candidates
created for si+1. The relative order over the candidates created for each si = {cx, cy, cz} can be any liner order such
that the candidates cx(si), cy(si), and cz(si) are ranked together. Finally, let 3 = (p, q1, q2, q3, q4). Clearly, for each
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6i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the approved candidates restricted to Ci in each vote lie consecutively on i. Then, due to Lemma 3.2 we
can specify the preferences of the votes in a way so that (Ci,ΠCiV ∪ΠCiW ) is single-peaked for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
It remains to prove the correctness.
(⇒) Assume that S′ ⊆ S is an exact 3-set cover of U . Consider the election after adding the following 5κ votes:r All 2κ votes pis such that s 6∈ S′;r For each s = {cx, cy, cz} ∈ S′, all three votes pixs , piys , and pizs .
As S′ is an exact 3-set cover, for each c ∈ C2 at most one of the above added votes approves c. As a result, each
candidate c ∈ C2 has final score at most 5κ − 2 + 1 = 5κ − 1. Moreover, for each cix, i ∈ {1, 2} at most one of the above
added votes, corresponding to s ∈ S′ such that cx ∈ s, approves cix. As a result, each candidate in C1 has final score at
most 5κ− 2 + 1 = 5κ− 1 too. As all unregistered votes approve p but none of {q1, q2, q3, q4}, the final score of p is 5κ and
the final score of each q1, q2, q3, q4 is 5κ− 1. In summary, p becomes the unique winner in the final election.
(⇐) Assume that ΠW ⊆ ΠW such that |ΠW | ≤ ` = 5κ and p becomes the unique winner after adding all votes in ΠW .
As all registered votes disapprove p and there are 5κ − 1 registered votes approving q1, it must be that |ΠW | = 5κ.
As each unregistered vote approves p, the final score of p is 5κ. Let ΠS = {pis | s ∈ S} and Π′ be the multiset of the
remaining unregistered votes. Then, ΠW contains exactly 2κ votes in ΠS . The reason is as follows. If ΠW contains less
than 2κ votes in ΠS , then ΠW must contain at least 3κ+ 1 votes in Π′. This implies that there are two votes in ΠW ∩Π′
which approve a common candidate c1x ∈ C1 for some cx ∈ U , leading c1x to have a final score at least 5κ − 2 + 2 = 5κ.
This contradicts that p is the unique winner. Moreover, if ΠW contains some vote pis ∈ ΠS where s = {cx, cy, cz}, then
none of pixs , piys , pizs can be included in ΠW , since otherwise due to the construction of the votes, one of cx(s), cy(s),
and cz(s) would have a final score at least 5κ, contradicting that p is the unique winner. Hence, if ΠW contains t votes
in ΠS , then |ΠW | ≤ t + 3(3κ − t) = 9κ − 2t. Hence, t > 2κ implies |ΠW | < 5κ, a contradiction. Therefore, ΠW contains
exactly 2κ votes in ΠS . Let S′ = {s ∈ S | pis 6∈ ΠW }. Due to the above analysis, it holds that |S′| = 3κ−2κ = κ. Moreover,
for each pis where s = {cx, cy, cz} ∈ S′, all three votes pixs , piys , pizs are in ΠW (otherwise ΠW contains less than 5κ votes).
From the fact that each candidate in C1 ∪ C2 can be approved by at most one vote in ΠW , it follows that S′ is an exact
3-set cover.
The NP-hardness of CCAV for r-approval for every r ≥ 5 can be obtained from the above reduction by adding some
dummy candidates. Precisely, for each cx ∈ U , we make r − 4 copies of c2x so that they consecutively lie between c1x
and c2x in 1. For each s ∈ S, we make r − 4 copies of s′ and let them lie consecutively with s′ in 2. In addition, we
create a set P of r − 4 candidates which consecutively lie on the left side of p in 3. Finally, we create a set Q of r − 4
candidates which consecutively lie on the right side of q4 in 3. Each vote approves the same candidates as defined
above together with r − 4 certain dummy candidates, who do not have any chance to become a winner by adding at
most ` votes. Precisely, we have the following registered votes.r 5κ votes approving {q1, q2, q3, q4} ∪Q.r For each s = {cx, cy, cz} ∈ S, 5κ− 2 votes approving cx(s), cy(s), cz(s), s′, and the r − 4 copies of s′.r For each cx ∈ U , 5κ− 2 votes approving c1x, c2x, c3x, c4x, and the r − 4 copies of c2x.
Regarding the unregistered votes, for each s = {cx, cy, cz} ∈ S, we create four votes respectively approvingr cx(s), cy(s), cz(s), p, and all candidates in P .r cx(s), c1x, c2x, and all the r − 4 copies of c2x.r cy(s), c1y, c2z, and all the r − 4 copies of c2y.r cz(s), c1y, c2z, and all the r − 4 copies of c2z.
The correctness proof is similar.
Now we turn our attention to CCDV. Yang and Guo [2014a] proved that CCDV for r-approval in 2-peaked elections
is NP-hard even for r = 3. We strengthen their result by showing that the problem remains NP-hard even when
restricted to elections that are both 2-axes single-peaked and 2-CP single-peaked. Our reduction is completely different
from theirs. In fact, to establish our result, we resort to a property of 3-regular bipartite graphs which has not been
used in the proof of Yang and Guo [2014a]. The 3-regular bipartite graph in our reduction comes from the graph-
representation of the RX3C problem. In general, this property says that for every 3-regular bipartite graph there are
two linear orders over the vertices so that every edge of the graph is between two consecutive vertices in at least one of
the two orders. We believe that this property is of independent interest. Recall that 3-regular graphs are those whose
vertices are all of degree 3.
LEMMA 3.4. Let G be a 3-regular bipartite graph with vertex set V (G) and edge set E(G). Then, there are two linear
orders 1 and 2 over V (G) and a partition (A1, A2) of E(G) such that for every i ∈ {1, 2} and for every edge {u, v} ∈ Ai,
it holds that u and v are consecutive in i.
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Fig. 1: An illustration of Lemma 3.4. The left-hand side is a 3-regular bipartite graph, and the right-hand side
showcases two linear orders over the vertices so that each edge is connected by two consecutive vertices in at
least one of the orders.
We defer the proof of this lemma to Appendix. Figure ?? is an illustrating example.
Now we are ready to unfold the NP-hardness of CCDV for r-approval in 2-axes and 2-CP single-peaked elections.
THEOREM 3.5. For every r ≥ 3, CCDV for r-approval restricted to elections that are both 2-axes single-peaked and
2-CP single-peaked is NP-hard.
PROOF. Let (U = {c1, . . . , c3κ}, S = {s1, . . . , s3κ}) be an instance of RX3C. We create a CCDV instance with the
following components as follows. We first consider r = 3 and then we discuss how to extend the reduction for any
r > 3.
Candidates C. We create in total 15κ + 5 candidates. In particular, for each cx ∈ U , we create two candidates c1x
and c2x. In addition, we create five candidates denoted by p, q1, q2, q3, and q4, where p is the distinguished candidate.
Let
C1 = {cix | i ∈ {1, 2}, cx ∈ U} ∪ {p, q1, q2, q3, q4}.
Finally, for each s = {cx, cy, cz} ∈ S, we create three candidates cx(s), cy(s), and cz(s) corresponding to cx, cy, and cz,
respectively. Let C2 be the set of all candidates corresponding to elements in S. Let C = C1 ∪ C2.
Votes ΠV . We only specify here the approved candidates in each created vote, then after the correctness proof we
utilize Lemma 3.2 to specify the linear preferences of all votes so that they are both 2-axes single-peaked and 2-CP
single-peaked. First, we create one vote approving p, q1, q2 and one vote approving p, q3, q4. In addition, for each
s = {cx, cy, cz} ∈ S, we create four votes as follows:r pis approving cx(s), cy(s), cz(s);r pixs approving cx(s), c1x, c2x;r piys approving cy(s), c1y, c2y; andr pizs approving cz(s), c1z, c2z.
It is easy to verify that the winning set is C1 \ {p, q1, q2, q3, q4}. Precisely, every winning candidate has score 3, p has
score 2, every qi where i ∈ [4] has score 1, and every candidate in C2 has score 2. Finally, we set ` = 7κ, i.e., we delete
at most 7κ votes.
The above construction clearly takes polynomial time. In the following, we prove the correctness of the reduction.
(⇒) Assume that S′ ⊆ S is an exact 3-set cover of U . Consider the election after deleting the following 7κ votes:r All κ votes pis such that s ∈ S′;r For each s = {cx, cy, cz} 6∈ S′, all three votes pixs , piys , and pizs .
Due to the construction and the fact that S′ is an exact 3-set cover, p has score 2 and every other candidate has score 1
after deleting these votes, implying that p becomes the unique winner.
(⇐) Assume that ΠV is a subset of ΠV with minimal cardinality such that |ΠV | ≤ ` = 7κ and p becomes the unique
winner after deleting all votes in ΠV . Due to the minimality of ΠV , no vote in ΠV approves p. Hence, p has score 2
after deleting all votes in ΠV . Let ΠS = {pis | s ∈ S} and ΠU = {pixs | s ∈ S, cx ∈ s}. For every pis 6∈ ΠV ∩ ΠS , all three
votes pixs , piys , pizs , where s = {cx, cy, cz}, must be included in ΠV , since otherwise one of cx(s), cy(s), and cz(s) would have
score 2 after deleting all votes in ΠV . Let t = |ΠV ∩ ΠS |. It follows from the above analysis that |ΠV | ≥ t+ 3(3κ− t) =
9κ− 2t, implying that t ≥ κ. On the other hand, as there are 6κ candidates in C1 \ {p, q1, q2, q3, q4} and every vote in ΠU
approves two of these candidates, to decrease their scores to at most 1, we need to delete at least 9κ − 3κ = 6κ votes,
i.e., |ΠV ∩ ΠU | ≥ 6κ. This directly implies that t = κ and |ΠV | = 7κ. Let S′ = {s ∈ S | pis ∈ ΠV }. Clearly, |S′| = t = κ.
Due to the above analysis, for every pis ∈ ΠV , none of pixs , piys , and pizs is in ΠV , since otherwise there would be more
than 7κ votes in ΠV . As a result, if there are two s, s′ ∈ S′ which contain a common element cx ∈ U , then c1x (and c2x)
would have score at least 2 after the deletion of all votes in ΠV , contradicting that p is the unique winner. So, the
3-subsets in S′ must be pairwise disjoint, implying that S′ is an exact 3-set cover.
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Fig. 2: An illustration of the construction of ∗j from ′j , j ∈ [2], in the proof of Theorem 3.5.
Finally, we show that the election constructed above is both a 2-axes election and a 2-CP election. We first how
that it is 2-axes single-peaked. To this end, we show that there exist two axes 1 and 2 over C such that for every
vote constructed above, the approved candidates in the vote are consecutive in at least one of 1 and 2. To this end,
we need an auxiliary graph. Note that the RX3C instance (U, S) can be represented by a 3-regular bipartite graph
with vertex-partition (U, S). In addition, there is an edge between some c ∈ U and s ∈ S if and only if c ∈ s. Due
to Lemma 3.4, there are two linear orders ′1 and ′2 over U ∪ S such that for every edge {c, s} in the graph where
c ∈ s ∈ S the two vertices c and s are consecutive in one of these two orders. We first construct a linear order ∗1
(resp. ∗2) over C based on ′1 (resp. ′2). First, we let ∗1 (resp. ∗2) be a copy of ′1 (resp. ′2) and then we do the
following modification.r For each cx ∈ cwhere x ∈ [3κ], we replace cx with the two candidates c1x and c2x corresponding to cx in∗1 (resp.∗2).
The relative order between c1x and c2x in ∗1 (resp. ∗2) does not matter.r For each s = {cx, cy, cz} ∈ S where {x, y, z} ⊆ [3κ], we replace s in ∗1 (resp. ∗2) with the three candi-
dates cx(s), cy(s), and cz(s) created for the element s. The relative order among these three candidates are deter-
mined as follows. If s is not the first element in ′1 (resp. ′2), let ci, i ∈ [3κ], be the element ordered immediately
before s in ′1 (resp. ′2), i.e., ci and s are consecutive in ′1 (resp. ′2) and ci ′1 s (resp. ci ′2 s). If i ∈ {x, y, z}, we
require that ci(s) is ordered before everyone in {cx(s), cy(s), cz(s)} \ {ci(s)} so that the three candidates c1i , c2i , and
ci(s) are consecutive. Symmetrically, if s is not the last element in ′1 (resp. ′2), and cj denotes the element or-
dered immediately after s in ′1 (resp. ′2) we have the following requirement: if j ∈ {x, y, z}, we require that cj(s)
is the last one among cx(s), cy(s), and cz(s), so that the three candidates c1i , c2i , and ci(s) are consecutive. See
Figure 2 for an illustration. We order cx(s), cy(s), and cz(s) so that the above requirements are fulfilled.
Given the final ∗1 and ∗2, let
1 = (q1, q2, p, q3, q4,
∗
1) and
2 = (q1, q2, p, q3, q4,
∗
2).
Clearly, the three candidates p, q1, and q2 are consecutive in both 1 and 2, and the three candidates p, q3, and q4
are consecutive in both 1 and 2 too. Due to Lemma 3.2, we can complete the linear order of the vote approving
exactly p, q1, and q2 (resp. p, q3, and q4) so that it is single-peaked with respect to 1 and, moreover, p, q1, and q2
(resp. p, q3, and q4) are the top-3 candidates. Let s ∈ S be a 3-subset in S. In 1 and 2, all the three candidates
created for s are consecutive. Let cx ∈ s be an element in s and let us consider the vote pixs whose top-3 candidates
are cx(s), c1x, and c2x. Clearly, {cx, s} is an edge in the above mentioned 3-regular graph. Then, due to Lemma 3.4, cx
and s are consecutive in at least one of the original orders ′1 and ′2, say, without loss of generality, ′1. Then due to
the definition of ∗1, the three candidates c1x, c2x, and cx(s) are consecutive. Therefore, all the three votes created for s
can be completed into linear-order votes which are single-peaked with respect at least one of 1 and 2 too, and whose
top-3 candidates are exactly those that are approved in these votes. This completes the proof that the constructed
election is a 2-axes election with 1 and 2 being the witness.
Now, we show that the above election is also a 2-CP election. To this end, it suffices to show that (Ci,ΠCiV ) is single-
peaked for each i ∈ [2]. Let 1 be an order of C1 such that for every cx, x ∈ [3κ− 1], the two candidates corresponding
to cx are ordered before the two candidates corresponding to cx+1. Moreover, for each cx ∈ U , c1x is ordered before c2x.
Furthermore, the candidates p, q1, q2, q3, and q4 are ordered after all the other candidates in C1 and they are ordered
as (q1, q2, p, q3, q4). Let 2 be an order of C2 such that for every s ∈ S, the three candidates corresponding to s are
ordered consecutively (the relative orders among them do not matter). Clearly, for each i ∈ [2] the approved candidates
restricted to Ci in every vote lie consecutively on i. In this case, we can specify the preferences so that each vote
restricted to Ci is single-peaked with respect to i as follows. Let pi be a vote. Let A1 and A2 be the set of approved
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9candidates in pi in C1 and in C2, respectively. Due to Lemma 3.2, we can specify the preference 1 of pi restricted to C1
(resp. C2) so that A1 (resp. A2) are ranked consecutively above all the other candidates and the preference is single
peaked with respect to 1 (resp. 2). Then, we define the preference os pi over the whole set of candidates as
A1  A2  C1 \A1  C2 \A2,
where the preferences among candidates in A1, and among candidates in C1 \ A1 are specified by 1, and the prefer-
ences among candidates in A2, and among candidates in C2 \ A2 are specified by 2. This preference is 2-CP single-
peaked with respect to the partition (C1, C2) as its restriction to C1 and C2 are exactly 1 and 2 which are single-
peaked with respect to 1 and 2, respectively, as discussed above.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.3, to extend the above proof to every r ≥ 4, we add a number of dummy candidates.
Precisely, we create r − 3 copies of q1 and r − 3 copies of q4 so that the copies and their originate are consecutive in
the respectively axis. Let A(q1) and A(q4) respectively denote the sets of copies of q1 and q4. For each cx ∈ U , we create
r − 3 copies of c2x which consecutively lie with c2x in the respective linear axis. For each s ∈ S, we create a set A(c)
of r − 3 candidates. Regarding the votes, we extend the two votes approving {p, q1, q2} and {p, q3, q4} respectively to
that approving {p, q1, q2} ∪A(q1) and {p, q3, q4} ∪A(q4). For each s ∈ S, we create four votes approving respectively the
following candidatesr cx(s), cy(s), cz(s) and all candidates in A(c);r cx(s), c1x, c2x and all copies of c2x;r cy(s), c1y, c2y and all copies of c2y;r cz(s), c1z, c2z and all copies of c2z.
The correctness proof if similar.
4. CONDORCET CONSISTENT VOTING
In this section, we study CCAV and CCDV for several Condorcet consistent voting correspondences, i.e., voting cor-
respondences which select exactly the Condorcet winner whenever it exists. We first show some FPT results for Con-
dorcet. Our results rely on an FPT-algorithm for the MIXED INTEGER PROGRAMMING WITH SIMPLE PIECEWISE
LINEAR TRANSFORMATIONS problem (MIPWSPLT). This problem is a generalization of integer linear programming
(ILP) with the entries of the input matrix being replaced with piecewise linear convex or concave functions. Bred-
ereck et al. [2017] recently proved that MIPWSPLT is FPT with respect to the number of variables. To establish our
FPT result, we need only a special case of the MIPWSPLT problem which is defined as follows.
INTEGER PROGRAMMING WITH SIMPLE PIECEWISE LINEAR TRANSFORMATIONS (IPWSPLT)
Input: A collection of s · t piecewise linear concave functions {fi,j : i ∈ [s], j ∈ [t]}, and a vector b ∈ Zs.
Question: Is there a vector x = 〈x1, x2, . . . , xt〉 of t integer variables such that for every i ∈ [s], it holds that
t∑
j=1
fi,j(xj) ≤ bi? (1)
LEMMA 4.1 ([BREDERECK ET AL. 2017]). IPWSPLT is solvable in O∗(t2.5t+o(t)) time, where t is the number of
variables.
Note that the result in [Bredereck et al. 2017] holds for the variant of IPWSPLT where the less than sign is replaced
with the greater than sign or the equal sign in (1).
For a vote pi over a set C of candidates and a candidate c ∈ C, let Ab(pi, c) (resp. Be(pi, c)) be the set of all candidates
ranked above (resp. below) c in pi, i.e., Ab(pi, c) = {c′ ∈ C : pi(c′) < pi(c)} (resp. Be(pi, c) = {c′ ∈ C : pi(c′) > pi(c)}).
THEOREM 4.2. CCAV and CCDV for Condorcet in k-axes elections are FPT with respect to k when k-axes are given.
PROOF. We prove the theorem by giving an IPWSPLT formulation for CCDV and CCAV, respectively, with the
number of variables being bounded by a function of k.
Let us consider first CCDV. Let ((C,ΠV), p ∈ C, `) be a given CCDV instance where (C,ΠV) is a k-axes election with
respect to k-axes 1, . . . ,k. We solve the instance as follows. Let ΠV1 , . . . ,ΠVk be a partition of ΠV such that for every
i ∈ [k], all votes in ΠVi are single-peaked with respect to i. Observe that for each pi ∈ ΠVi , i [k], all candidates ranked
above the distinguished candidate p lying consecutively on i. Moreover, either all of them lie on the left-side of p or
all of them lie on the right-side of p on i. For each ΠVi , i ∈ [k], let ΠLVi (resp. ΠRVi ) be the multiset of all votes in ΠVi
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where all candidates ranked above p lie on the left-side (resp. right-side) of p in i. Precisely, for each i ∈ [k],
ΠLVi = {pi ∈ ΠVi : ∀(c ∈ C \ {p}, pi(c) < pi(p))[ci p]} and
ΠRVi = {pi ∈ ΠVi : ∀(c ∈ C \ {p}, pi(c) < pi(p))[pi c]} .
For each i ∈ [k] and X ∈ {L,R}, let tXi = |ΠXVi | and (piX(i,1), piX(i,2), . . . , piX(i,tXi )) be an order over Π
X
Vi such that pi
X
(i,x)(p) ≥
piX(i,x+1)(p) for all x ∈ [tXi −1]. An observation is that for every x where x ∈ [tXi −1], Ab(piX(i,x+1), p) ⊆ Ab(piX(i,x), p), i.e., the
candidates ranked above p in piX(i,x+1) are also ranked above p in pi
X
(i,x). This implies that there is an optimal solution
such that for each i ∈ [k] and X ∈ {L,R} such that tXi > 0, this solution includes either none of ΠXVi , or it includes
all votes piX(i,x) such that x ∈ [y] for some positive integer y ≤ tXi and excludes all the other votes in ΠXVi . Based on
the observation, we create an instance of IPWSPLT as follows. We create in total 2k variables. In particular, for each
axis i, i ∈ [k], we create two variables denoted by xLi and xRi , where xLi (resp. xRi ) indicates how many votes in ΠLVi
(resp. ΠRVi ) are included in the solution. Let (c1, c2, . . . , cm) be any arbitrary but fixed order of C \ {p}, where m is the
number of candidates minus one. For each integer i ∈ [k], each X ∈ {L,R}, and every candidate c ∈ C \ {p}, we define
a piecewise linear concave function fi,X,c : R≥0 → R≥0 as follows. First, fi,X,c(0) = 0. Second, for each positive integer
x ≤ tXi , fi,X,c(x) is the number of votes in {piXi,1, . . . , piXi,x} that rank c above p if tXi > 0 and fi,X,c(x) = 0 otherwise. For
each integer x > tXi we have that fi,X,c(x) = fi,X,c(tXi ). Finally, for a real number x between integers y and y + 1, we
have that
fi,X,c(x) = fi,X,c(y) + (x− y) · fi,X,c(y + 1).
The restrictions are as follows.r For every i ∈ [k] and every X ∈ {L,R}, we have that xXi ∈ N and 0 ≤ xXi ≤ tXi .r Since we seek a feasible solution of size at most `, we have that∑
i∈[k]
(xLi + x
R
i ) ≤ `.
r To ensure that p is the Condorcet winner in the final election, for each candidate c ∈ C \ {p}, we have that
2
N (c, p)− ∑
i∈[k]
X∈{L,R}
fi,X,c
(
xXi
) < |ΠV | − ∑
i∈[k]
X∈{L,R}
xXi .
In the above inequality, N(c, p) is calculated with respect to ΠV . The right side is the number of votes in the final
election, and the left side is the double of the number of votes ranking c above p in the final election. This inequality
ensures that p beats c in the final election. The above programming can be solved in FPT time with respect to k by the
algorithm studied in [Bredereck et al. 2017] (Theorem 2).
Consider now CCAV. Let ((C,ΠV), p ∈ C,ΠW , `) be a CCAV instance where (C,ΠV ∪ ΠW) is a k-axes election with
respect to k-axes 1,2, . . . ,k. The algorithm to solve the instance is similar to the above one for CCDV. Let
(ΠW1 , . . . ,ΠWk) be a partition of ΠW such that for every i ∈ [k], all votes in ΠWi are single-peaked with respect
to i. The observation above holds for ΠW as well. For each i ∈ [k], let ΠLWi (resp. ΠRWi ) be the multiset of all votes
in ΠWi (resp. ΠWi ) where all candidates ranked above p lie on the left-side (right-side) of p in i. Precisely, for each
i ∈ [k],
ΠLWi = {pi ∈ ΠWi : c ∈ C \ {p} , pi (c) < pi (p) , ci p} and
ΠRWi = {pi ∈ ΠWi : c ∈ C \ {p}, pi(c) < pi(p), pi c}.
For each i ∈ k and each X ∈ {L,R}, let tXi = |ΠXWi | and (piX(i,1), piX(i,2), . . . , piX(i,tXi )) be an order of all votes in Π
X
Vi such that
piX(i,x)(p) ≤ piX(i,y)(p) for all integers x and y such that 1 ≤ x < y ≤ tXi . For each i ∈ [k], we create two variables denoted
by xLi and xRi . In particular, xLi (resp. xRi ) indicates how many votes in ΠLWi (Π
R
Wi ) are included in the solution. We
define the same piecewise concave functions as in the above algorithm for CCDV. Now, we describe the restrictions.r For every i ∈ [k], we have 0 ≤ xLi ≤ tLi and 0 ≤ xRi ≤ tRi .
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r Since we seek a feasible solution of size at most `, we have that∑
i∈[k]
(xLi + x
R
i ) ≤ `.
r To ensure that p is the Condorcet winner in the final election, for each candidate c ∈ C \ {p}, we have that
2
N (c, p) + ∑
i∈[k]
X∈{L,R}
fi,X,c
(
xXi
) < |ΠV |+ ∑
i∈[k]
X∈{L,R}
xXi .
In the above inequality, N(c, p) is calculated with respect to ΠV . The above programming can be solved in FPT time
with respect to k by the algorithm studied in [Bredereck et al. 2017] (Theorem 2).
Now we consider Condorcet winner in k-CP elections. Yang and Guo [2017] proved that CCAV for Condorcet in 3-
peaked elections and CCDV for Condorcet in 4-peaked elections are NP-hard. We strengthen their results by showing
that CCAV and CCDV for Condorcet are NP-hard in 3-CP elections, a subclass of 3-peaked elections.
THEOREM 4.3. CCAV and CCDV for Condorcet in 3-CP elections are NP-hard.
PROOF. We reduce the RX3C problem to CCAV and CCDV. Let (U = {c1, . . . , c3κ}, S = {s1, . . . , s3κ}) be an RX3C
instance. Consider first CCAV. The components of the CCAV instance are as follows.
Candidates C. We create in total 12κ+1 candidates. In particular, for each cx ∈ U , we create one candidate c′x. Let
C1 = {c′x : cx ∈ U}.
In addition, for each s = {cx, cy, cz} ∈ S, we create three candidates cx(s), cy(s), cz(s) corresponding to cx, cy, cz,
respectively. Let C2 be the set of candidates corresponding to the 3-subsets in S. Finally, we create a distinguished
candidate p. Let C3 = {p}.
Let 1 = (c′1, . . . , c′2) be the order of C1 according to the indices of the candidates. Moreover, let 2 be any arbitrary
order of C2 such that for each s ∈ S the three candidates corresponding to s are ordered consecutively.
Registered Votes ΠV . We create in total 5κ − 3 votes, each of which ranks p in the last position. The positions of
other candidates in a vote are set in a way so that the vote restricted to C1 and C2 is single-peaked with respect to 1
and 2, respectively.
Unregistered Votes ΠW . The unregistered votes are created according to S. In particular, for each s = {cx, cy, cz} ∈
S, we create four votes pis, pixs , piys , and pizs such that:r pis ({cx(s), cy(s), cz(s)}) = {1, 2, 3}, pis(p) = 4;r pixs (cx(s)) = 1, pixs (c′x) = 2, pixs (p) = 3;r piys (cy(s)) = 1, piys (c′y) = 2, piys (p) = 3; andr pizs (cz(s)) = 1, pizs (c′z) = 2, pizs (p) = 3.
The exact positions of cx(s), cy(s), cz(s) in pis, and the positions of the remaining candidates in each of the above
four votes are set in a way so that the votes restricted to 1 and 2 are single-peaked. Let ΠS = {pis : s ∈ S} and
ΠU = {pixs : s ∈ S, cx ∈ s}.
Finally, we set ` = 5κ, i.e., we are allowed to add at most 5κ votes from ΠW . The above construction clearly takes
polynomial time. It remains to prove the correctness.
(⇒) Assume that S′ ⊆ S is an exact set cover of U . Consider the election after adding the following 5κ votes:
(1) All 2κ votes pis such that s 6∈ S′;
(2) For each s = {cx, cy, cz} ∈ S′, all the three votes pixs , piys , and pizs .
Clearly, the final election has in total 10κ− 3 votes. Moreover, for each c ∈ C2 at most one of the above added 5κ votes
ranks c above p. As a result, there are at most (5κ−3)+1 = 5κ−2 votes ranking c above p, implying that p beats every
candidate in C2 in the final election. As S′ is an exact set cover, for each c′x, among the 5κ added votes only the vote pis,
corresponding to s ∈ S′ such that cx ∈ s, ranks c′x above p. Analogous to the above analysis, we know that p beats every
candidate in C1 in the final election. In summary, p becomes the Condorcet winner after adding the above 5κ votes.
(⇐) Assume that ΠW ⊆ ΠW such that |ΠW | ≤ ` = 5κ and p becomes the Condorcet winner after adding all votes
in ΠW . As p is not the Condorcet winner with respect to the registered vote constructed above, it holds that |ΠW | ≥ 1.
Then, we can observe that |ΠW | = 5κ must hold, since otherwise there is at least one candidate which ranked above p
in at least (5κ − 3) + 1 = 5κ − 2 and hence is not beaten by p in the final election. Moreover, ΠW contains exactly 2κ
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votes in ΠS . The reason is as follows. If ΠW contains less than 2κ in ΠS , then ΠW contains more than 3κ votes
from ΠU . This implies that there are two votes in ΠW ∩ ΠU both of which rank a common candidate c ∈ C2 above p,
leading to c not being beaten by p in the final election. On the other hand, if ΠW contains some vote pis ∈ ΠS where
s = {cx, cy, cz}, then none of pixs , piys , and pizs can be included in ΠW , since otherwise due to the construction of the
votes, one of cx(s), cy(s), cz(s) is not beaten by p in the final election. Hence, if ΠW contains t votes in ΠS , then
|ΠW | ≤ t+ 3(3κ− t) = 9κ− 2t, which is strictly smaller than 5κ if t > 2κ, a contradiction. Let S′ = {s ∈ S : pis 6∈ ΠW }.
Due to the above analysis, it holds that
|S′| = 3κ− |ΠW ∩ΠS | = 3κ− 2κ = κ.
Moreover, for each pis where s ∈ S′ and s = {cx, cy, cz}, all three votes pixs , piys , pizs are in ΠW (otherwise ΠW contains less
than 5κ votes). As for each candidate c ∈ C1 there can be at most one vote in ΠW ranking c above p, it follows that S′
is an exact set cover.
Consider now the reduction for CCDV for Condorcet in 3-CP elections. We first create the same candidates as in the
above reduction for CCAV, and then we create one more candidate q in C3. Hence, we have C3 = {p, q} now. Let 1
and 2 be defined as above. Concerning the votes, we adopt all 12κ votes in ΠS constructed above, with the candidate q
being ranked immediately above p (hence, if pi(p) = t in a vote pi in advance, we have now pi(q) = t and pi(p) = t + 1).
In addition, we create a multiset of two votes such that p and q are ranked in the 1st and 2nd positions, respectively.
Finally, we create a multiset of 5κ − 1 votes such that p and q are ranked in the second-last and the last positions,
respectively. Let Π be the multiset of the above 5κ+ 1 votes. The positions of all candidates other than p and q in each
of Π are set in a way so that this vote restricted to 1 and 2 is single-peaked. In total, we have 17κ + 1 votes. We
set ` = 7κ, i.e., we are allowed to delete at most 7κ votes. Clearly, the construction can be done in polynomial-time.
Utilizing similar arguments as in the above proof for the correctness of the reduction for CCAV, we can show that
there is an exact set cover of U if and only if the CCDV instance has a solution of size 7κ. Precisely, let S′ ⊆ S be an
exact set cover, then ΠV = {pis : s ∈ S′} ∪ {pixs : s ∈ S \ S′, cx ∈ s} is a solution. One can check that after the deletion
of all votes in ΠV , for every candidate c ∈ C \ {p}, there are exactly 5κ votes ranking c above p. As there remain
17κ + 1 − 7κ = 10κ + 1 votes in total, p becomes the Condorcet winner. A significant observation for the proof of the
other direction is that any optimal solution of the CCDV instance is disjoint with Π, since otherwise q would beat p.
Analogous to the above proof for CCAV, we can first show that any solution ΠV contains exactly κ votes in ΠS and 6κ
votes in ΠU , where ΠU = {pixs : s ∈ S, cx ∈ s}. Then, we can show that S′ = {s ∈ S : pis ∈ ΠV } is an exact set cover of U .
Now we discuss CCAV and CCDV for Copelandα, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and Maximin in k-axes elections for small values
of k. In a sharp contrast to the fixed-parameter tractability of CCAV and CCDV for Condorcet in k-axes elections, the
same problems for both Copelandα and Maximin are NP-hard even for k = 2. In particular, Yang and Guo [2014b] and
Yang [2015a] established reductions from the X3C problem to CCAV and CCDV for Copelandα, 0 ≤ α < 1, in elections
with single-peaked width 2. It turned out that the elections constructed in their proofs are 2-axes single-peaked, as
shown in the proof of the following theorem. In addition, for CCAV and CCDV for Copeland1 and Maximin, Yang and
Guo [2014b] and Yang [Yang 2015a] proved they are NP-hard in elections with single-peaked 3, which are again turned
out to be 2-axes single-peaked. Nevertheless, for these two rules, we provide new reductions because of the following
reasons. First, compared with the reductions in [Yang and Guo 2014b; Yang 2015a], the new reductions are simpler
with less candidates, votes, and types of votes. The simplicity is not purely because that we use a reduction from the
restricted version of the X3C problem. In fact, some proofs in [Yang and Guo 2014b; Yang 2015a] heavily rely on the
assumption that every element in the universe U occurs in an even number of 3-subsets in the given collection S which
is obviously not fulfilled in any RX3C instance. Second, our reductions for CCAV and CCDV are unified reductions
in the sense that they apply to both Copeland1 and Maximin, but in [Yang and Guo 2014b; Yang 2015a] there are
separate reductions for Copeland1 and Maximin.
A general explanation of the complexity difference of Condorcet, Maximin, and Copelandα, 0 ≤ α < 1, is that to
make the distinguished candidate p the Condorcet winner, we need only to focus on the comparisons between p and
every other candidate. In other words, if two votes rank the same set of candidates above p, they have the same impact
on the solution. However, in Copelandα and Maximin this does not hold.
THEOREM 4.4. CCAV and CCDV for Copelandα, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and Maximin in 2-axes elections are NP-hard.
PROOF. In this proof, we first show the NP-hardness of CCAV and CCDV for Copelandα, 0 ≤ α < 1, in 2-axes
elections. This is done by showing that the elections constructed in the NP-hardness reductions of CCAV and CCDV
for Copelandα, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, in [Yang 2015a] (Theorem 3.2) are 2-axes single-peaked. To make the proof as complete as
possible, we provide the definitions of the elections but refer the correctness proofs to [Yang 2015a]. After this, we
derive reductions for CCAV and CCDV in 2-axes elections which apply to both Copeland1 and Maximin. All reductions
are from the RX3C problem. Let (U = {c1, . . . , c3κ}, S = {s1, . . . , s3κ}) be an instance of the RX3C problem.
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CCAV for Copelandα, 0 ≤ α < 1. The constructed election in [Yang and Guo 2014b] is as follows.
Candidates C. For each cx ∈ U there are two candidates cLx and cRx . In addition, there are two candidates p and p′.
The distinguished candidate is p.
Registered Votes ΠV . There are κ− 1 registered votes, each of which has the preference
cL3κ  cR3κ  cL3κ−1  cR3κ−1  · · ·  p′  p.
In addition, there is one vote with preference
cR3κ  cL3κ  cR3κ−1  cL3κ−1  · · ·  p  p′.
Unregistered Votes: ΠW . The unregistered votes are created according to S: for each s ∈ S, there is one vote pis
with preference
p  p′  {cL1 , cR1 }  {cL2 , cR2 }  · · ·  {cL3κ, cR3κ},
such that for each cx ∈ U it holds that cLx  cRx if cx ∈ s and cRx  cLx otherwise.
We show that the (C,ΠV ∪ΠW) is 2-axes single peaked. To this end, let A = (cL1 , cL2 , . . . , cL3κ) and B = (cR1 , cR2 , . . . , cR3κ).
In addition, let 1 = (p,A,
←−
B, p′) and 2 = (
←−
A, p, p′, B). It is fairly easy to check that all registered votes are single-
peaked with respect to 1 and all unregistered votes are single-peaked with respect to 2.
CCDV for Copelandα, 0 ≤ α < 1. The corresponding election given in [Yang 2015a] is constructed based on an
instance of the X3C problem. We replace the X3C instance with an RX3C instance and obtain the following instance.
The candidate set is the same as the one for CCAV for Copelandα, where 0 ≤ α < 1. Moreover, let 1 and 2 be defined
as above.
Votes ΠV . First, for each s ∈ S, there is one vote pis with the preference
{cL3κ, cR3κ}  · · ·  {cL1 , cR1 }  {p}  {p′}.
Moreover, pis prefers cLx to cRx if and only if cx ∈ s. It is fairly easy to see that the above votes are single-peaked with
respect to 1. Let ΠS = {pis : s ∈ S}. In there are 2κ− 2 votes with the preference
p  p′  cL1  cR1  · · ·  cL3κ  cR3κ,
and two votes with preference
p  p′  cR1  cL1  · · ·  cR3κ  cL3κ.
One can check that the above 2κ votes are single-peaked with respect to 2.
We point out that the above reductions do not apply to Copeland1 and Maximin. In particular, in both reductions,
the final score of the distinguished candidate is 6α · κ+ 1 and that of every other candidate is α · (6κ+ 1) after adding
(for CCAV) or deleting (CCDV) the votes in a solution. Therefore, only when 0 ≤ α < 1, the distinguished candidate is
the unique winner. For Copeland1 and Maximin, we derive the following reductions.
CCAV for Copeland1 and Maximin. We construct the following instance. In this reduction, we assume that κ ≥ 3.
Candidates C. We create 9κ + 1 candidates in total. More specifically, for each cx ∈ U we create a set C(cx) =
{c1x, c2x, c3x} of three candidates. In addition, we create a distinguished candidate p. Let C =
⋃
cx∈U C(cx) ∪ {p}.
Registered Votes ΠV . We create in total κ registered votes. Precisely, we first create two votes with the following
preference
c13κ  c23κ  c33κ  c13κ−1  c23κ−1  c33κ−1  · · ·  p.
Then, we create κ− 2 votes, each of which has the preference
c23κ  c33κ  c13κ  c23κ−1  c33κ−1  c13κ−1  · · ·  p.
Let A1 = (c11, c12, . . . , c13κ) and A2 = (c31, c21, c32, c22, . . . , c33κ, c23κ). Note that as we assumed κ ≥ 3, κ− 2 is a positive integer.
In addition, let 1 = (A1,
←−
A2, p). It is easy to verify that the above votes are single-peaked with respect to 1.
Unregistered Votes ΠW . We create 3κ unregistered votes based on S. For each s ∈ S, we create a vote pis with the
preference
p  {c11, c21, c31}  · · ·  {c13κ, c23κ, c33κ}.
Moreover, for each cx ∈ U we make c2x  c3x  c1x if cx ∈ s, and c3x  c1x  c2x otherwise. Let A3 = (c31, c11, c32, c12, . . . , c33κ, c13κ)
and A4 = (c21, c22, . . . , c23κ). In addition, let 2 = (
←−
A3, p, A4). It is easy to check that all unregistered votes are single-
peaked with respect to 2.
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We complete the construction by setting ` = κ, i.e., we are allowed to add at most κ votes.
The reduction can be completed in polynomial time. It remains to prove the correctness. We show the correctness
for Copeland1 and Maximin together. In particular, for the sufficiency direction, we show that adding ` = κ votes
corresponding to an exact set cover of U results in the distinguished candidate p being the unique weak Condorcet
winner. It is well-known that both Copeland1 and Maximin are weak Condorcet consistent in the sense that they
select exactly the weak Condorcet winners whenever they exist. The proof for the necessity is established by showing
that the only way to make p the unique Copeland1/Maximin winner by adding at most ` is to make p the unique weak
Condorcet winner.
(⇒) Let S′ be an exact set cover of U and let Π = {pis : s ∈ S′} be the set of the κ unregistered votes corresponding
to S′. In addition, let E = (C,ΠV ∪ Π). We claim that p is the unique weak Condorcet winner in E . Due to the above
construction, all κ unregistered votes in Π rank p in the top. As all the κ registered votes rank p in the last, we know
that p is a weak Condorcet winner in E . It remains to show that there are no other weak Condorcet winners. Due to
the construction of the unregistered votes and the fact that S′ is an exact set cover, for every cx ∈ U there is exactly
one vote in Π with preference c2x  c3x  c1x and exactly κ − 1 votes with preference c3x  c1x  c2x. Together with the
registered votes, there are more than 2 + (κ − 1) = κ + 1 votes preferring c1x to c2x, κ + 1 votes preferring c2x to c3x, and
(κ− 1) + κ = 2κ− 1 ≥ κ+ 1 (we assumed κ ≥ 3) votes preferring c3x to c1x, implying that every candidate corresponding
to cx ∈ U is beaten by at least one candidate in E . As this holds for all cx ∈ U , we know that no candidate except p is a
weak Condorcet winner in E .
(⇐) Let Π be a solution of the above constructed CCAV instance and let E = (C,ΠV ∪ Π). Observe that |Π| = κ,
since otherwise at least one of c13κ, c23κ, and c33κ is a weak Condorcet winner, implying that p can be neither the unique
Copeland1 winner nor the unique Maximin winner in E . Due to the above construction, when |Π| = `, the number of
votes ranking p in the top equals those ranking p in the last in E . Therefore, p ties all the other candidates and hence
is a weak Condorcet winner in E . As Copeland1 and Maximin are weak Condorcet consistent, p must be the unique
Condorcet winner in E , meaning that every candidate except p is beaten by at least one candidate. Due to the above
construction, when |Π| = ` = κ, all candidates created for a cx ∈ U ties all candidates created for another cy ∈ U \ {cx}.
As a result, for every cx ∈ U , every c1x, c2x, c3x is beaten by someone in{c1x, c2x, c3x}. As all unregistered votes preferring c3x
to c1x, and there are κ− 2 registered votes preferring c3x to c1x, there are in total 2κ− 2 ≥ κ+ 1 (recall that we assumed
κ ≥ 3) preferring c3x to c1x in E . This means that c3x beats c1x in E . Therefore, it must be that c1x beats c2x, and c2x beats c3x
in E . As all κ registered votes preferring c2x to c3x, there is at least one vote pis ∈ Π preferring c2x to c3x. Due to the
construction of the unregistered votes, vote pis prefers c2x to c3x if and only if cx ∈ s. As this holds for all cx ∈ U , the
subcollection corresponding to Π, i.e., {s : pis ∈ Π}, covers U . From |Π| = κ, it follows that {s : pis ∈ Π} is an exact set
cover of U .
CCDV for Copeland1 andMaximin. We construct the following instance. In this reduction, we assume that κ ≥ 4.
The candidate set is the same as the above one for CCAV for Copeland1 and Maximin. Moreover, 1 and 2 are defined
the same as above.
Votes ΠV . First, for each s ∈ S, we create one vote pis with the preference
{c11, c21, c31}  {c12, c22, c32}  · · ·  {c13κ, c23κ, c33κ}  {p}.
Inside each {c1x, c2x, c3x}, where x ∈ [3κ], we have c1x  c2x  c3x if cx ∈ s, and c2x  c3x  c1x otherwise. Let ΠS = {pis : s ∈ S}.
Clearly, all votes in ΠS are single-peaked with respect to1. Second, we create a multiset Π′ of 2κ votes that are single-
peaked with respect to 2. In particular, we create one vote with the preference
p  c23κ  c33κ  c13κ  · · ·  c21  c31  c11,
and 2κ− 1 votes with the preference
p  c33κ  c13κ  c23κ  · · ·  c31  c11  c21.
In total, we have 5κ votes. It is easy to see that c21 is the Condorcet winner assuming κ ≥ 4. Finally, let ` = κ, i.e., we
are allowed to delete at most κ votes. The above construction clearly takes polynomial-time. We show the correctness
based on that Copeland1 and Maximin are weak Condorcet consistent similar to the above proof for CCAV.
(⇒) Let S′ ⊆ S be an exact set cover of U . Let Π = {pis : s ∈ S′} and let E = (C,ΠV \Π) = (C,Π′ ∪ (ΠS \Π)). We argue
that p is the unique weak Condorcet winner in E . Clearly, |Π| = |S′| = κ. As all the 2κ votes in Π′ rank p in the top and
all the 3κ− κ = 2κ votes in ΠS \Π rank p in the last, we know that p ties all other candidates in E and hence is a weak
Condorcet winner. Due to the above construction, for each cx ∈ U there are exactly 3− 1 = 2 votes with the preference
c1x  c2x  c3x, and 3κ−3− (κ−1) = 2κ−2 votes with the preference c2x  c3x  c1x in ΠS \Π. Then, as there is exactly one
vote with the preference c2x  c3x  c1x and 2κ− 1 votes with the preference c3x  c1x  c2x in Π′, it holds that c1x is beaten
by c3x, c3x is beaten by c2x, and c2x is beaten by c1x in the election E , implying that none of c1x, c2x, c3x is a weak Condorcet
winner in E . As this holds for all cx ∈ U , we know that p is the unique weak Condorcet winner in E .
Only for personal use. Updated: January 2020.
15
(⇐) Assume that there is a Π ⊆ ΠV such that |Π| ≤ κ and p becomes the unique Copeland1/Maximin winner in
E = (C,ΠV \ Π). Observe first that it must be that Π ⊆ ΠS and |Π| = κ, since otherwise c21 remains as the Condorcet
winner. (Recall that in ΠS there are 3κ − 3 votes ranking c21 in the top. Assuming κ ≥ 4, c21 remains as the Condorcet
winner after deleting at most `−1 votes, or deleting at most ` votes in total with at least one of them from Π′) It follows
that p ties all the other candidates and hence is a weak Condorcet winner in E . Because Copeland1 and Maximin are
weak Condorcet consistent, p must be the unique weak Condorcet winner. This means that every candidate except p
is beaten by at least one candidate in E . Due to the above construction, for every two distinct cx, cy ∈ U such that
1 ≤ x < y ≤ 3κ, all the 2κ votes in Π′ rank all candidates in C(cy) above all candidates in C(cx), and all the 3κ− ` = 2κ
votes in ΠS \Π rank these candidates the other way around. Therefore, in the election E , all candidates in C(cx) tie all
candidates in C(cy) for all y 6= x. Moreover, as all the 2κ votes in Π′ prefer c3x to c1x, the only candidate which is able to
beat c3x in E is c2x. This further implies that c2x is beaten by c1x. As there are exactly 2κ−1 votes in Π′ preferring c1x to c2x,
there are at least two votes in ΠS \Π preferring c1x to c2x. Due to the construction, this means that there is at most one
vote pis ∈ Π which prefers c1x to c2x and cx ∈ s. As this holds for all cx ∈ U and |Π| = κ, the subcollection {s ∈ S : pis ∈ Π}
is an exact set cover of U .
Note that the NP-hardness of CCAV and CCDV for Copelandα, 0 ≤ α < 1 in elections with single-peaked width 2,
established by Yang and Guo [2014a], implies the NP-hardness of the same problems in 2-CP elections because any
election with single-peaked width k is a k′-CP election for some k′ ≤ k [Erde´lyi et al. 2017].
For Copeland1 and Maximin in elections with single-peaked width 2, Yang and Guo [2014a] proved that CCAV and
CCDV are polynomial-time solvable. Our results stand in contrast to theirs.
THEOREM 4.5. CCAV and CCDV for Copeland1 and Maximin in 2-CP elections are NP-hard.
PROOF. We prove the theorem by reductions from the RX3C problem. Let (U, S) be a given RX3C instance where
|U | = |S| = 3κ. Without loss of generality, we assume that κ ≥ 3. Let (c1, c2, . . . , c3κ) be an arbitrary but fixed order
of U . Similar to Theorem 4.4, our proofs are based on that Copeland1 and Maximin are weak Condorcet consistent.
CCAV for Copeland1 and Maximin. We create an instance as follows.
Candidates C. For each cx ∈ U , x ∈ [3κ], we create a set Cx = {c1x, c2x, c3x, c4x} of four candidates. In addition to these
candidates, we create a candidate p which is the distinguished candidate. In total, we have 12κ+ 1 candidates.
In the following, we create the votes so that they are 2-CP single-peaked with respect to the following axis. Particu-
larly, let
1 = (p, c
1
1, c
3
1, c
1
2, c
3
2, . . . , c
1
3κ, c
3
3κ)
and
2 = (c
2
1, c
4
1, c
2
2, c
4
2, . . . , c
1
3κ, c
4
3κ).
Let  = (1,2). Clearly, all created candidates are in the linear order  which is served as the axis.
Registered Votes ΠV . First, we create κ+ 1 votes with the preference
C3κ  C3κ−1  · · ·  C1  p.
Among these votes, we specify the preferences inside all Cx, x ∈ [3κ], such that the following requirements are fulfilled
(number of votes: preferences)
κ− 2: c3x  c1x  c4x  c2x
1: c4x  c2x  c3x  c1x
2: c3x  c4x  c1x  c2x
Additionally, we create one vote with the preference
p  C1  C2  · · ·  C3κ
so that inside each Cx, x ∈ [3κ], it holds that
c1x  c2x  c3x  c4x.
The pairwise comparisons among candidates in each Cx with respect to the registered votes are shown in Figure 3.
Unregistered Votes ΠW . The unregistered votes are created according to S. Particularly, for each s ∈ S, we create
one vote pis with the preference
p  C1  C2  · · ·  C3κ.
In side each Cx where x ∈ [3κ], we set
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Fig. 3: The pairwise comparisons among candidates in each Cx with respect to the registered votes in the proof
of CCAV for Copeland1 in Theorem 4.5. The number beside an arc from a candidate to another candidate is
the number of registered votes ranking the former above the latter. The node with number j inside presents
the candidate cjx. The comparison between c1x and c3x, and the comparison c2x and c4x are not given since their
comparisons can be easily analyzed base on the single-peakedness in the correctness proof given below.
c1x  c2x  c3x  c4x if cx ∈ c, and
c2x  c4x  c1x  c3x if cx /∈ c.
One can check all the above created votes are single peaked with respect to each of1 and2, and hence the election
is a 2-CP election.
Finally, we set ` = κ, i.e., we are allowed to add at most κ unregistered votes.
The construction clearly can be done in polynomial time. In the following, we prove the correctness of the reduction.
(⇒) Assume that there is an exact set cover S′ ⊆ S of U . Consider the new election after adding the κ votes
corresponding to S′. In the new election, there are exactly 2κ+ 2 votes among which κ+ 1 have the preference
C3κ  · · ·  C1  p
and κ+ 1 votes with the preference
p  C1  · · ·  C3κ.
Therefore, in the new election, p is a weak Condorcet winner. Due to the above construction of the unregistered votes,
we know that inside each Cx, x ∈ [3κ], exactly one unregistered vote with the preference c1x  c2x  c3x  c4x and exactly
κ−1 unregistered votes with the preference c2x  c4x  c1x  c3x are added, which results in total one vote with c1x  c2x, κ
many with c2x  c3x, one with c3x  c4x, and κ − 1 many with c4x  c1x in the added votes. With the help of Figure 3, we
can easily check that in the new election c1x beats c2x, c2x beats c3x, c3x beats c4x, and c4x beats c1x, meaning that none of Cx
is a weak Condorcet winner in the new election. Therefore, p is the unique weak Condorcet winner.
(⇐) Assume that we can add at most ` = κ unregistered votes so that p becomes the unique Copeland1/Maximin
winner. Observe that we have to add exactly ` votes since otherwise someone in C1 will be the winner as a majority of
votes rank Cx in the top in this case. Analogous to the analysis in the above direction, this implies that p ties all the
other candidates and hence is a weak Condorcet winner in the final election. As Copeland1 and Maximin are weak
Condorcet winner, everyone else must be beaten by at least one candidate. Note that in the new election, for different
x, y ∈ [3κ], candidates in Cx tie all candidates in Cy. Moreover, for all x ∈ [3κ], the candidate c1x ties the candidate c3x,
and c2x ties c4x. As all unregistered votes and multiple registered votes prefer c2x to c3x for all x ∈ [3κ], c2x beats c3x in
the new election. Therefore, the only candidate which is able to beats c2x in the new election is c1x. As there are κ + 1
registered votes preferring c1x to c2x, we know that there is at least one vote pis which prefers c1x to c2x and is added in
the election. Due to the above construction, a vote pis prefers c1x to c2x if and only if cx ∈ s. As this holds for all cx ∈ U ,
the subcollection corresponding to the added votes must be an set cover of U . As we add exactly ` = κ votes, it must
be an exact set cover.
CCDV for Copeland1/Maximin The reduction here is similar to the above reduction. The candidates are exactly
the same as in the above reduction. In addition, we adopt all the registered and unregistered votes created in the
above reduction but in each of them we reverse the position of the candidate p. In particular, we have κ+ 1 votes with
the preference
p  C3κ  C3κ−1  · · ·  C1
where the preferences inside each Cx are the same as in the above reduction. In addition, we create one vote pi with
the preference
C1  C2  · · ·  C3κ  p
with the preference inside each Cx, x ∈ [3κ], being c1x  c2x  c3x  c4x, as in the above reduction. Then, for each c ∈ U ,
we create a vote pic with the preference
C1  C2  · · ·  C3κ  p
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with the preference inside each Cx, x ∈ [3κ], being the same as in the above reduction. Let ΠS = {pis : s ∈ S} be the
set of the votes corresponding to S. Let ΠV denote the multiset of all votes in this reduction. These votes are 2-axes
single-peaked with respect to a “locally reversed” 1 defined above. Precisely, the new axis is
(c11, c
3
1, c
1
2, c
3
2, . . . , c
1
3κ, c
3
3κ, p, c
2
1, c
4
1, c
2
2, c
4
2, . . . , c
2
3κ, c
4
3κ).
Finally, we set ` = 2κ. The reduction can be done in polynomial time. Now we show the correctness.
(⇒) If there is an exact set cover S′ ⊆ S, we delete all the 2κ votes corresponding to S \ S′. After deleting these
votes, it holds that p ties all candidates, and everyone in some Cx ties everyone in some Cy such that x 6= y. As the
preferences inside each Cx remain unchanged in all votes, for all Cx, x ∈ [3κ] in the new election, everyone in Cx is
beaten by someone in the same set Cx. Therefore, p is the unique winner in the new election.
(⇐) Assume that we can remove a multiset Π of at most ` = 2κ votes so that p becomes the unique
Copeland1/Maximin winner in E = (C,ΠV \ Π). As we have exactly κ + 1 votes where p is ranked in the last posi-
tion, and we have in total 4κ+ 2 votes, it must be that exactly ` = 2κ votes with p being ranked in the top are deleted
(Otherwise, p is beaten by all candidates). Recall that only votes in ΠS ∪ {pi} rank p in the top and hence it holds that
Π ⊆ ΠS ∪{pi}. We first claim that the vote pi is not deleted, i.e., pi 6∈ Π. To see this, check that for every x ∈ [3κ], all votes
in ΠS ∪ {pi} prefer c2x to c3x, and in addition to these votes there is one more vote ranking c2x above c3x. This implies that
in the election E , there are in total (3κ+ 1) + 1− 2κ = κ+ 2 votes ranking c2x above c3x. This means that c2x beats c3x in E .
Moreover, similar to the above analysis, we know that after deleting 2κ votes ranking p in the top, p ties all the other
candidates, all candidates from different Cx and Cy where x, y ∈ [3κ] are tied, and for all x ∈ [3κ] the candidate c1x ties
c3x, and c2x ties c4x. Given that Copeland1 and Maximin are weak Condorcet consistent, everyone except p is beaten by
at least one candidate. Due to the above analysis, for each x ∈ [3κ], the only candidate which beats c2x must be c1x for all
x ∈ [3κ]. Assume for the sake of contradiction that the vote pi ∈ Π. Let pis ∈ ΠS ∩ Π be any arbitrary vote in ΠS that is
deleted too. Such a vote must exist since 2κ− 1 > 1. Let cx be any element in s. Due to the definition of pis, pis ranks c1x
above c2x. That is, there is at least one cx ∈ U such that at least two votes ranking c1x above c2x are deleted, resulting in
at most κ+ 1 votes ranking c1x above c2x in E , implying that c2x is not beaten by c1x, a contradiction. The claim is proved.
Given the claim, we know that Π ⊆ ΠS . As c1x beats c2x where x ∈ [3κ] in E , at most two votes with the preference c1x  c2x
can be included in Π, leaving at least one vote with the preference c1x  c2x in ΠS \ Π. Let S′ = {s ∈ S : pis ∈ ΠS \ Π} be
the subcollection corresponding to the votes in ΠS that are not deleted. Clearly, |S′| = κ. Because for every s ∈ S and
every cx ∈ U , the vote pis ranks c1x above c2x if and only if cx ∈ s, S′ covers U . As |S′| = κ, S′ is an exact set cover of U .
5. RECOGNITION OF NEARLY SINGLE-PEAKEDNESS
It is known that determining whether an election is single-peaked (1-axis) is polynomial-time solvable [Bartholdi III
and Trick 1986; Doignon and Falmagne 1994; Escoffier et al. 2008]. For every k ≥ 3, Erde´lyi, Lackner, and Pfan-
dler [2017] proved that determining whether an election is a k-axes election is NP-hard. We complement these results
by showing that determining whether an election is a 2-axes election is polynomial-time solvable, completely filling
the complexity gap of the problem with respect to k. To this end, we reduce the problem to the 2-SATISFIABILITY
problem (2SAT).
2-SATISFIABILITY
Input: A CNF conjunction formula with such that each clause consists of exactly two literals.
Question: Is there a truth-assignment which satisfies all clauses?
It is well-known that the 2-Satisfiability problem can be solved in linear time in the number of clauses [DBL 1976;
Aspvall et al. 1979; Gu et al. 1996].
Single-peaked elections have a nice characterization [Ballester and Haeringer 2011] which is useful in our study.
Definition 5.1 (Worst-diverse structure (WD-structure)). A WD-structure (pix, piy, piz, a, b, c) in and election (C,ΠV) is
a 6-tuple such thatr pix, piy, piz ∈ ΠV , a, b, c ∈ C;r pix(a) > max{pix(b), pix(c)};r piy(b) > max{piy(a), piy(c)}; andr piz(c) > max{piz(a), piz(b)}.
Three votes WD-conflict if there are three candidates forming a WD-structure with them.
Definition 5.2 (α-structure). An α-structure (pix, piy, a, b, c, d) in an election (C,ΠV) is a 6-tuple such thatr pix, piy ∈ ΠV , a, b, c, d ∈ C;
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r pix(a) < pix(b) < pix(c), pix(d) < pix(b); andr piy(c) < piy(b) < piy(a), piy(d) < piy(b).
Two votes α-conflict if there are four candidates forming an α-structure with them. The following lemma was studied
by Ballester and Haeringer [2011].
LEMMA 5.3 ([BALLESTER AND HAERINGER 2011]). An election (C,ΠV) is single-peaked if and only if there are no
WD-structure and α-structure in (C,ΠV).
Armed with the above lemma, we are able to develop the polynomial-time algorithm for recognizing 2-axes elections.
THEOREM 5.4. Determining whether an election is a 2-axes election is polynomial-time solvable. In particular, it
can be solved in O(n2 ·m3 · (n+m)) time, where m and n denotes the number of candidates and the number of votes in
the given election.
PROOF. Let (C,ΠV) be an election. Let m = |C| and n = |ΠV | denote the number of candidates and the number of
votes respectively. The problem is equivalent to seeking a partition (ΠT ,ΠF ) of ΠV so that both (C,ΠT ) and (C,ΠF ) are
single-peaked. We reduce the problem to the 2SAT problem as follows. For each vote pi ∈ ΠV , we create a variable x(pi).
Hence, a partition (ΠT ,ΠF ) of ΠV corresponds to a truth assignment of the variables, and vice versa: variables corre-
sponding to votes in ΠT are assigned true and variables corresponding to votes in ΠF are assigned false.
If there are no WD-structures in (C,ΠV), we create the clauses as follows. For every two votes pi and pi′ which α-
conflict, we create two clauses (x(pi), x(pi′)) and
(
x(pi), x(pi′)
)
. In order to satisfy both clauses, x(pi) and x(pi′) must be
assigned differently, and thus pi and pi′ are partitioned into different sets. From Lemma 5.3, there is a truth assignment
satisfying all clauses if and only if (C,ΠV) is a 2-axes election. Assume now that there are WD-structures in (C,ΠV).
Let a, b, and c be three candidates in a WD-structure. Let (Πa,Πb,Πc) be a partition of ΠV such that, among a, b,
and c, Πa consists of all votes ranking a last, Πb all votes ranking b last, and Πc all votes ranking c last. Observe
that Πa, Πb, and Πc are all nonempty. Moreover, if (C,ΠV) is 2-axes single-peaked, then none of ΠT and ΠF contains
three votes from Πa, Πb, and Πc, respectively, where ΠT and ΠF are as discussed above. Due to symmetry, we have
three cases to consider:
Case 1. Πa ⊆ ΠT , Πb ⊆ ΠF .
Case 2. Πa ⊆ ΠT , Πc ⊆ ΠF .
Case 3. Πb ⊆ ΠT , Πc ⊆ ΠF .
If (C,ΠV) is 2-axes single-peaked, at least one of the above cases holds, and vice versa. Due to symmetry, we analyze
only Case 1. The analysis for the other two cases are similar. First, if (C,Πa) or (C,Πb) are not single-peaked, we
discard this case. Assume now that both (C,Πa) and (C,Πb) are single-peaked. Then, we create the clauses as follows.
We shall ensure that there is a partition (ΠT ,ΠF ) of ΠV such that (C,ΠT ), (C,ΠF ) are single-peaked, Πa ⊆ ΠT and
Πb ⊆ ΠF , if and only if the 2SAT instance has a truth assignment satisfying all the following clauses.r If there is a vote pi ∈ Πc which α-conflicts with one vote in Πa (resp. Πb), or WD-conflicts with two votes in Πa
(resp. Πb), then pi must be included in ΠF (resp. ΠT ). In this case, we create a clause (x(pi)) (resp. (x(pi))).r If there are two votes pi, pi′ ∈ Πc which WD-conflict with one vote in Πa (resp. Πb), we create one clause (x(pi), x(pi′))
(resp. (x(pi), x(pi′))), to ensure that at least one of {pi, pi′} is in ΠF (resp. ΠT ).
One may wonder that there might be three votes pi, pi′, pi′′ ∈ Πc that WD-conflict. We don’t need to consider this
case since it has been implicitly dealt with in the second type of clauses. Assume that (pi, pi′, pi′′, d, d′, d′′) is a WD-
structure, where d, d′, d′′ ∈ C and pi, pi′, pi′′ ∈ Πc. Let pi1 and pi2 be two arbitrary votes from Πa and Πb, respectively. If
the last ranked candidates among d, d′, d′′ in pi1 and pi2 are the same, say, d, then, pi′ and pi′′ WD-conflict with both pi1
and pi2. Hence, two clauses (x(pi′), x(pi′′)) and (x(pi′), x(pi′′)) have been created according to the above discussion. In
order to satisfy these two clauses, x(pi′) and x(pi′′) must be assigned different values and the votes pi′ and pi′′ are
partitioned into different sets accordingly. On the other hand, assume that the last ranked candidates among d, d′, d′′
in pi1 and pi2 are different. Without loss of generality, assume that pi1 ranks d in the last and pi2 ranks d′ in the last.
Then, pi′ and pi′′ WD-conflict with pi1, and pi and pi′′ WD-conflict with pi2. According to the above discussion, we have two
clauses (x(pi′), x(pi′′)) and (x(pi), x(pi′′)). Again, to satisfy these two clauses, x(pi), x(pi′), and x(pi′′) cannot be assigned
the same value, leading to pi, pi′, pi′′ not being partitioned into the same set.
Now we analyze the running time of the algorithm which is dominated by the following steps.
(1) Find a WD-structure and the three candidates a, b, and c as discussed above. This can be done in O(n3 ·m3) time.
The partition (Πa,Πb,Πc) as defined in the algorithm can be constructed in O(m · n) time.
(2) Check if (C,Πa) and (C,Πb) are single-peaked, which can be done in O(m · n) time [Escoffier et al. 2008].
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(3) Find all pairs (pi, pi′) such that pi and pi′ α-conflict and pi ∈ Πc and pi′ ∈ Πa ∪ Πb, and create a clause for each such
pair. This can be done in O(n2 ·m4) by enumerating all possibilities.
(4) Find all 3-tuple (pi, pi′, pi′′) such that pi, pi′, and pi′′ WD-conflict and pi ∈ Πa, pi′ ∈ Πb, pi′′ ∈ Πc, and create one clause
for each 3-tuple as described above. This can be done in O(n3 ·m3).
In summary, we need O(n2 ·m3 · (n+m))-time to create O(n2 ·m3 · (n+m)) clauses. Then, the whole algorithm runs
in O(n2 ·m3 · (n+m)) time as the 2SAT can be solved in linear time in the number of clauses [DBL 1976].
6. CONCLUSION
Aiming at pinpointing the complexity border of CCAV and CCDV between single-peaked elections and general
elections, we have studied these problems in k-axes elections and k-CP elections and obtained many tractability
and intractability results. We particularly studied the voting correspondences r-approval, Condorcet, Maximin, and
Copelandα, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Our study closed many gaps left in the literature. We refer to Table 1 for a summary of our
results. Though that our focus in this paper is the unique-winner model of CCAV and CCDV, it should be pointed out
that all our results, including polynomial-time solvability results, FPT results, and NP-hardness results hold for the
nonunique-winner model of CCAV and CCDV as well. Recall that in the nonunique-winner model, the goal is to make
the distinguished candidate p a winner, but not necessarily the unique winner.
In addition, we proved that determining whether an election is a k-axes election is polynomial-time solvable for
k = 2. Given that the problem is polynomial-time solvable for k = 1 [Ballester and Haeringer 2011] and NP-hard for
every k ≥ 3 [Erde´lyi et al. 2017], our result closes the final complexity gap of the problem with respect to k.
There remain several open questions (see Table 1) for future research. In particular, the complexity of CCAV and
CCDV for Copelandα, 0 ≤ α < 1, restricted to single-peaked elections remained open. In addition, investigating
the complexity of other voting problems, e.g., DESTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY ADDING/DELETING VOTES/CANDIDATES,
BRIBERY, in nearly single-peaked elections would be another promising topic for future research.
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Appendix
In this section, we provide the proof of Lemma 3.4.
PROOF. Let G be a 3-regular bipartite graph with vertex set V (G) and edge set E(G). Due to a classic theorem of
Ko¨nig [1916], E(G) can be partitioned into three perfect matchings M1, M2, and M3 of G. Let H1 be the graph with
vertex set V (G) and edge set M1 ∪M2, and let H2 be the graph with vertex set V (G) and edge set M3. As M1 and M2
are perfect matchings, each vertex in H1 is of degree 2. In other words, H1 consists of vertex-disjoint cycles. We shall
remove some edges from H1 to H2 so that both H1 and H2 consist of only vertex-disjoint paths. Obviously, H2 is already
such a graph. We use the following procedure to suit our purpose.
1 foreach cycle L in H1;
2 do
3 Let {u,w} be an edge in L such that u and w are in different paths and are both of degree-1 in H2;
4 Remove the edge {u,w} from H1 into H2;
5 end
Clearly, after adding an edge as described in Line 4 in the above procedure intoH2, the graphH2 still consists of only
vertex-disjoint paths. After removing one edge in a cycle, the cycle becomes a path. So, after the above procedure, H1
consists of only vertex-disjoint paths too. The proof is not completed because we have not shown that when a cycle inH1
is considered in the above procedure, there always exists an edge as required in Line 3. We shall prove this statement
now by induction. Let L1, L2, . . . , Lt be the vertex-disjoint cycles in H1, and without loss of generality, assume that Li
is considered before Li+1 in the procedure for each i ∈ [t − 1]. Moreover, for ease of exposition, for each i ∈ [t], let Hi2
denote the graph H2 after exactly i cycles in H1 are considered. So, the edge set of H12 is exactly M3. As M1, M2,
and M3 are disjoint perfect matchings of G, for any edge in L1 the two endpoints of this edge are in different paths
and are of degree 1 in H12 . Assume that, for some i ∈ [t], after cycles L1, L2, . . . , Li−1 are dealt with, Hi−12 consists of
vertex-disjoint paths. Consider now the cycle Li. We first have the following claim.
Claim. Every vertex in the circle Li is a degree-1 vertex in Hi−12 .
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We prove the claim as follows. Assume for the sake of contradiction there is a vertex u in Li who has at least
two neighbors in the graph Hi−12 . Recall that all cycles in H1 are vertex-disjoint, and hence u does not belong to any
of L1, L2, . . . , Li−1. Due to the above procedure, we know that all edges incident to u inHi−12 must be fromM3. However,
if u has at least two neighbors in Hi−12 , M3 cannot be a matching, a contradiction.
Based on the above claim, we find a desired edge in Li as follows. Let {u,w} be an arbitrary edge in Li. If {u,w}
fulfills the condition in Line 3, we are done. Otherwise, due to the above claim, it must be that u and w are the two
ends of a path in Hi−12 . Let w′ be the other neighbor of w in the cycle Li. Due to the above claim, w′ has degree 1 in
Hi−12 . This directly means that w′ cannot be in the same path as u and w. Then, {w,w′} is the desired edge which can
be removed from Li to Hi−12 as described in Line 4.
Now, let Ht1 and Ht2 be the graphs returned by the above procedure. Then, we can define the desired linear orders 1
and 2 based on the fact that both Ht1 and Ht2 consists of only vertex-disjoint paths. Precisely, let (P1, P2, . . . , Pt) be an
arbitrary but fixed order of all paths in Ht1. For each Pi where 1 ∈ [t], let (Pi(1), Pi(2), . . . , Pi(`)) denote the path Pi,
i.e., ` is the number of vertices in the path and there is an edge between Pi(j) and Pi(j + 1) for all j ∈ [` − 1] in Ht1.
Then, we define 1 so that all vertices in Pi are ordered before all vertices in Pi+1 for all i ∈ [t − 1]. Moreover, the
relative order of the vertices in each Pi in 1 is exactly (Pi(1), Pi(2), . . . Pi(`)). The linear order 2 can be constructed
analogously.
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